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Summary 
For the one-sided testing problem, necessary and sufficient conditions are given 
for reconciliation of evidence. That is, conditions under which the frequentist p-value is 
equal to a Bayesian posterior probability are detailed. Moreover, it is also observed that 
when reconciliation is obtained, it must result in a coherent inference. 
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1. Introduction 
In hypothesis testing, evidence is based on a post-experimental measure of evaluation which, to 
a frequentist, takes the form of the observed level of significance, that is, the p-value. To a Bayesian, 
evidence is based on the assessed posterior probability of the null hypothesis (H0 ). It is shown in 
Casella and Berger (1987) that in the location problem it is possible for a frequentist and Bayesian to 
reconcile their measures of evidence assessment. They show that for a wide class of prior distributions 
the infimum of the Bayesian posterior probability of H0 is equal to the p-value; in other cases the 
infimum is less than the p-value. 
For the one-sided testing problem 
(1.1) vs. 
Casella and Berger (1987) show that if X = x is observed, where X "' f(x-0), then the frequentist p-
value, p(x), is equal to a Bayesian posterior probability using a Lebesgue prior. We have 
oo 0o 
(1.2) p(x) = P(X?: xiB0) = I f(t-B0)dt = I f(x-O)dB = P(B::; B0 1x) 
x -oo 
where we see that f(x-B) is also the posterior distribution forB starting from 1r(B)dB = dB. 
After hearing a talk about the above result, Morris DeGroot noted that this sufficient condition 
was also necessary for reconciliation of evidence in the location case. This follows because, if evidence 
can be reconciled, there exists a prior distribution 1r(B) that yields p(x) = P(B ::; 80 I x). In the 
location case this means we must have 
Bo Bo 
(1.3) 
00 I f(x-B)1r(B)dB I f(x-B)1r(B)dB If(x-B0)dx = .,.~~00'------- = -'-00=---:(~) --I mll"x x f(x-B)1r(B)dB 
-oo 
where mll"(x) is the marginal distribution of x. Now (1.3) must hold for every value of 80 , and if we 
differentiate both sides of (1.3) with respect to 80 , we have 
(1.4) r( -B ) - f(x-Bo)7r(Bo) 1' X 0 - ( ) , 
mll"x 
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so it follows that 1r(B0 ) = m?r(x), which only happens if 1r(B) = constant. Thus, in the location case, 
evidence can be reconciled if and only if 1r( B) = constant. 
After outlining the above argument, Professor DeGroot then asked if, in general, necessary 
conditions for reconciliation could be deduced. This paper answers that question. 
The main result of the paper is that evidence can be reconciled if and only if 1r( B) is the right-
invariant Haar measure of the underlying group G. Furthermore, it follows from the results of Heath 
and Suddereth (1989), that the inferences based on right-invariant priors are coherent. Thus, if 
evidence can be reconciled, the p-value will give coherent inferences. 
In Section 2 we define needed notation, and Section 3 contains the main theorem, the 
equivalence of the p-value and the posterior probability from the right-invariant prior. Section 4 
contains some examples, and Section 5 contains a concluding discussion, and shows the relationship 
between evidence reconciliation and coherence. An appendix contains some necessary technical 
lemmas. 
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2. Preliminaries 
The random variable X is assumed to take values in a space $, having density f(xiO) with 
respect to au-finite measure p. The unknown parameter is Ote C IR1 . We wish to test 
(2.1) 
Specifically, we let e 0 = ( -oo, 00 ). In addition assume: 
(i) There is a group G acting on g; which induces a group G on e, with group identities e and e, 
respectively. 
(ii) G and G are isomorphic and are locally compact Hausdorff topological groups. 
(iii) geo = eo, ge = e. 
(iv) I f(xlgO)d!lr(g) < oo a.s., where ll is a right invariant measure on G. 
G (v) The measure JJ is relatively invariant under the action of G with multiplier v; that is, v is a 
continuous homomorphism from G to (0, oo) and p(gA) = p(A)v(g) for all measurable subsets 
A of$. 
(vi) f(gxlgO) = f(xiO)v(g). 
For examples of groups that are used in statistics see Berger (1985, Chapter 6). The following 
definition is a standard one for invariant testing problems. 
Definition: The testing problem (2.1), with density f(xiO), is invariant under G if (iii) and (vi) are 
satisfied. 
Although our discussion is for testing problems with 0 fIR, it is clear that analogous results will 
hold for vector-valued parameters. In this case the rejection region must be redefined as a region in 
space rather than an interval. Also, in Section 3 we will show how to proceed in the presence of 
nuisance parameters. 
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3. Reconciling Evidence 
In this section we give the main theorem, which characterizes the equivalence between p-values 
and posterior probabilities. Recall that eo = ( -oo, Bo), so a test of Ho: () e eo vs. Hl :()I eo often have 
critical region of the form Ra = {x:x > ca}• for some constant c0 • (Canonical exponential families 
and location families will have critical region of the form of Ra.) For such regions, the p-value is 
given by 
00 
(3.1) p(x) = P 00 (X~ x) = J f(xl80)dx . 
A simple transformation gives 
(3.2) 
X 
p(x) = J f(yle)dy 
(1-1 x· 0 
where "·" is the group operation and "-1" is the group inverse. 
For a Bayesian approach to the testing problem, we use a prior 1r. Then a Bayes rule (posterior 
probability) is 
(3.3) 6~(x) = m:(x) J f(xl8)7r(8)d8 , 
eo 
where m7r is the marginal density of x, 
(3.4) m7r(x) = f f(xl8)1r( O)d() . 
e 
The goal is to show p(x) = 6~(x). Define the ratio .A(O) = 7r(8)/7rr(8), where 1rr is a right invariant 
Haar measure. In what follows, we will examine the structure of 6~ in greater detail. We can write 
(3.5) 
6~(x) = m:(x) J f(xl8)7r( 8)d8 
eo 
= m:(x) f f(xi8).A(8)7rr(8)d8 
eo 
= m5x) J f(xly-l).A(y-1)7re(y)dy 
e-1 
0 
(by Lemma A.l) 
(by Lemma A.3) 
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fd~finit~on of 1re, the left- ) 
\ mvanant Haar measure 
(by Lemma A.2) 
(rn Lemma A.2 let t(yg) = s(yg)>.( (yr1 ) . Therefore t(y) 
Using a similar argument it follows that 
(3.6) m11'(x) = Kv(x)1r€(x) J f(y\e)>.(y-1x-1)dy _ Kv(x)71'€(x)C~(x) . 
9; 
Note that in the special case where 1r = 71'r (that is, >. = 1) we have the following reductions: 
(i) (i.e., C ,\ (x) = 1 'r/x) ; 
(ii) 8"!Jr (x) = J f(yJe)dy , 
e-1 x· 0 
r r 
and hence 8"JJ (x) _ p(x). Thus, if p = 8"JJ for an arbitrary prior 1r we need 8"JJ = 8"JJ to occur. It 
can also be seen 
'r/x 
<=> 71' is proportional to 1rr up to a multiplicative constant . 
Therefore 1r 1s also a right-invariant Haar measure. We have therefore established the following 
theorem: 
Theorem 3.1. The Bayes estimator 8"JJ(x) = p(x) for all x iff 1r is proportional to the right-invariant 
Haar measure on G, hence is a right-invariant Haar measure on G. 
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In many testing problems one must have procedures that account for nuisance parameters. The 
t-test (see Example 4.2) is perhaps the most classical example of a test with a nuisance parameter. 
To study the reconciliation of p-values and posterior probabilities in multiparameter problems we 
need the concept of the composite model. We shall refer the reader to Barndorff-Nielsen (1983) for a 
detailed exposition of these models. The main reason for using composite models is that they are 
quite useful for handling multiparameter problems. Consider a model with an underlying density 
function f(x I(}, g) relative to an invariance measure on a sample space $. Let G be a group action on 
$. Under some set of conditions, contained in Theorem 5.1 of Barndorff-Nielsen (1983), it is shown 
under the principles of G-sufficiency (Barnard, 1963), inference for (} is to be drawn from the marginal 
model. It follows from Theorem 5.1 of Barndorff-Nielsen (1983) that the marginal model's density 
function is given by 
fM(xiO)= Jf(xiO, g),B(dg), 
G 
where {3( ·) is the right invariant measure on G. Therefore, under the principle of G-sufficiency 
inference should be based on fM. Hence, p-values for the one-sided tests discussed in the beginning of 
this section will be of the form 
00 00 
p(x) = J fM (y I Oo)dy = J f(y I Oo, g),B( dg)dy . 
X G 
If one integrates the posterior 7r(O, glx) with respect to ,B(dg) prior on the nuisance parameters, it 
may be seen that the p-value and the posterior probability of the null hypothesis are equal. Example 
4.2 illustrates this relationship. Further results on the agreement between the measures of evidence 
assessment for multiparameter problems are mentioned in Tsui and Weerahandi (1989). 
8 
4. Examples 
In this section we look at a few special cases to illustrate the result of Theorem 3.1. As we will 
see, Theorem 3.1 does more than assert the equivalence of a p-value and posterior probability. It 
gives us a way to calculate p-values and, moreover, can give us a way to define p-values. 
Example 4.1: Scale families. Let X "' (-& )f(~ ), and suppose we want to test H0 : u $ u 0 vs. 
H1 :u > o-0 based on observing X=x. The right-invariant Haar measure for the scale groups is 1r(u) = 
~du, and we have 
( 4.1) 
""o 
J [M(x/u)] ~du 
8~(x) = ""'~,-----­
J [M(x/u)] ~du 
o 
00 
= J }0 f(tfu0)dt 
X 
= p(x) ' 
showing the equivalence of the p-value and the Bayes rule. D 
A slightly more complicated case is location-scale, where the definition of the p-value may not 
be immediately evident. In the next example, however, we know what to expect for the p-value. 
Example 4.2: Normal location-scale. For testing H0 : (} $ 00 vs. H1 : (} > 00, where X1 ,· · ·,Xn are iid 
n(B,a-2), both unknown, the right invariant prior is ~dOdo-. The joint density of the sample, by 
sufficiency a function only of X= k:EXi and S2 = n~l E(Xi-X)2, is given by 
(4.2) 
Therefore, the posterior probability of H0 is 
oo 0o 1 ( - 2 2) I I --2 n(x-ll) + (n-1)s - 1- e 2u dOdu O'"n+1 
{4.3) - 2 0 -oo P{Ho I x, s ) = ~oo'::---::-oo::-------.-11----,-r ---;:,2----=2"")--I I --=---2\n(x-ll) + (n-1)s - 1- e 2u dOdu O'"n+1 
o-oo 
The integral over a- is straightforward to evaluate, yielding 
{4.4) 
llo I (n{x-0)2 + {n-1)s2f"12dO 
P{H0 I x, s2) = -:-:;:;<'----------I (n{x-0)2 + {n-1)s2f"12d0 
-oo 
I (1 + t2/{n-1)f"12dt 
'[n(x-00 ) 
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00 I (1 + t2/(n-1)f"12dt 
-oo 
- P(T '-fll(x-Oo)) 
- n-1 > S ' 
where T n-1 is a Student's t random variable with n-1 degrees of freedom. This last expression is the 
usual p-value for this situation, showing the reconciliation of evidence. D 
There are situations where the p-value does not have a "usual" definition, but by Theorem 3.1, 
it can be unambiguously defined as the Bayes posterior probability arising from a right-invariant 
prior. The next example illustrates such a case. 
Example 4.3: General location-scale. For a sample X1,· · ·,Xn from a general location-scale family, 
the posterior distribution of 0, using the right-invariant Haar measure, is given by 
(4.5) 
00 I i[l1 ~(xi-O)y)dy 
7r{O I x1 ,·. ·,Xn) = "oo~~_,--------I Lfl1 ~(xi-O)y)dydO 
-oo 0 
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and the posterior probability of H0 : B $ B0 is 
lio 
(4.6) P(Ho I Xv·. ·,Xn) = J 7r(B I xl,·. ·,Xn)dB ' 
-oo 
which can be taken as the definition of the p-value. In fact, this expression for the p-value agrees 
with the one arising from conditional likelihood-based calculations. 
From Fisher (1934), or Barndorff-Nielsen (1983), the conditional distribution of 0 and ff, the 
maximum likelihood estimators of B and cr, is given by 
(4.7) 
where ai = (xi-0)/ff, i =a,· ··,n, are ancillary statistics. It is straightforward to verify that the p-
value for H0 : B $ 00 , using ( 4. 7), is equal to ( 4.6). More precisely, 
Bo oo oo 
(4.8) P(H0 1x17···,xn) = J 7r(Bix1,···,xn)dB = J J g(B, iJIB, cr, a17···,an)diJdB = p-value, 
-oo Bo-Bo o 
i'fo 
where 00 and G-0 are the observed values of the random variables 8 and iJ. Thus, the posterior 
probability against the right Haar measure agrees with the p-value of conditional likelihood inference. 
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5. Discussion 
Reconciliation of Bayesian and frequentist measures of evidence has, in recent years, received 
much attention. I.J. Good (1987) notes that the p-value and Bayesian posterior probability of the 
null hypothesis are both here to stay, so the relationship between them needs to be taken seriously. 
Good notes that these relationships form a large part of the problem of pure rationality, namely, the 
extent Bayesian and non-Bayesian may be synthesized. 
DeGroot (1973) also had an interest in the problem of reconciling evidence. His approach was 
to construct alternative distributions and find priors for which the p-value and posterior probabilities 
match. As in this article, DeGroot's work was essentially on the one-sided testing problem. 
Berger and Selke (1987) discuss the relationship between the p-value and the posterior 
probability of a point null hypothesis. They show that in the two-sided problem these measures of 
evidence can be quite different. Their main conclusion is that the p-value tends to overstate the 
evidence against the null hypothesis, that is, the p-value tends to be smaller than the Bayesian 
posterior probability. 
The disagreement between the one-sided and the two-sided problem is, now, not at all 
surprising. Hwang eta/. (1990) prove that the p-value is an admissible decision procedure in the one-
sided testing problem, while it is inadmissible in the two-sided problem. The proofs of these 
admissibility results follow from the fact that the generalized Bayes rules form a complete class of 
procedures and that one-sided p-values are generalized Bayes rules while the two-sided p-values are 
not. In particular, in the case of one-sided hypothesis tests we have shown that the p-value is equal 
to the Bayes procedure against the right-invariant Haar measure prior. Moreover, in Example 4.2 it 
is shown that the p-value from the t-test is generalized Bayes, hence it is admissible. 
The proof of the complete class results in Hwang et a/. (1990) show that admissible procedures 
are limits of Bayes rules and that the limits of Bayes rules are generalized Bayes rules. There is an 
interesting relationship between the limits of Bayes rules and right Haar measure priors. Take a 
sequence of priors (w.r.t. 1rr) on G, 
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where {Gn} is an increasing sequence of sets whose union is G. Then for each x c ffi the sequence of 
posterior distributions 1r nC ·I x) converge weakly to 1rr( ·I x), the posterior induced from the prior 
measure 1rr. In general, the convergence of 1r n( • I x) to 1rr( • I x) will not be uniform. The idea of 
convergence of the posterior led Stone (1990) to examine the distance 
and consider X to be the r.v. with marginal distribution induced from the Bayesian joint distribution 
which gives B the prior 1r n and X the distribution P 9• Stone showed that dn(X)-+ 0 in probability if 
and only if G is amenable and IGnl is properly chosen. From these results we see that not all limits 
of proper Bayes rules will converge to the 1rr-Bayes rule unless G and Gn are chosen appropriately. 
Another result of interest which follows for Theorem 3.1 is that the p-value, in the one-sided 
problem, is coherent in the sense of Heath and Sudderth (1978, 1989). For the coherence framework 
the hypothesis-testing problem may be formulated as in Berger (1985, pp. 120-122). It is shown in 
Heath and Sudderth (1978) that if one uses posterior inference based on the right invariant Haar 
measure then the resulting inference will be coherent. Specifically, when using the p-value as an 
inference procedure in the one-sided hypothesis testing problem the resulting inference is coherent. An 
excellent discussion on the concept of coherence and the related notion of rationality can be found in 
Berger (1985, pp. 120-122). 
Using somewhat different reasoning, Fraser (1961, 1968) has implicitly recommended the use of 
right invariant Haar priors in structural inference. This follows because Fraser's structural 
probability distribution is exactly the corresponding invariant posterior distribution. Confidence 
procedures may also be based on this distribution, as in Hora and Buehler (1966), Bondar (1977), and 
Chang and Villegas (1986). 
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Appendix 
The following three technical lemmas are needed to establish Theorem 3.1. 
Lemma A.1. There exists a constant K such that for any integrable function t, 
(A.1) J t(x-1)1rr(x)dx = K J t(x)1re(x)dx, 
A A-1 
where 1rr and 'Ire are right and left invariant Haar measures, respectively. 
Proof. If x = y-1 and q(y) = 11"r(y-1)J(y), where J is the Jacobian of the transformation, then as in 
(A.2) 
Berger (1985, p.411), q is a left invariant Haar measure. Since the right and left Haar 
densities are unique up to a multiplicative constant, q(y) = K1re(y). Therefore 
J t(x-1)1rr(x)dx = J t(y)1rr(y-1)J(y)dy = K J t(y)1re(y)dy. 0 
A A-1 K1 
Lemma A.2. For the multiplier v in (v) of Section 2 and for any integrable function t, 
(A.3) J t(yg)1re(y)dy = v(g) J t(y)1re(y)dy . 
A gA 
Proof. As in Berger (1985, p. 412), 1re(yg)J~(y) = v(g)1re(y), where J~(y) is the Jacobian of the 
transformation y--+ gy. Now by applying this identity and the transformation y = xg the 
results follows. 0 
Lemma A.3. The density function can be written f(xlg) = f( g-1(x) I e )J!-1(x), where J!-1 is the 
Jacobian of the transformation x-+g-1x. 
Proof. See Berger (1985, p. 410). 
For more information on Haar measure see the book by Nachbin (1965). 
14 
Referenas 
Barnard, G. A. (1963). Some logical aspects of the fiducial argument. J. Roy. Statist. Soc., Ser. 8 
25, 111-114. 
Berger, J. 0. (1985). Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis, Second Edition. New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Casella, G. and Berger, R. L. (1987). Reconciling Bayesian and frequentist evidence in the one-sided 
testing problem. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 82, 112-139. 
Chang, T. and Villegas, C. (1986). On a theorem of Stein relating Bayesian and classical inference in 
group models. Canad. J. Statist. 14, 289-296. 
Heath, D. and Suddereth, W. (1978). On finitely additive priors, coherence, and extended 
admissibility. Ann. Statist. 6, 333-345. 
Heath, D. and Suddereth, W. (1989). Coherent inference from improper priors and finitely additive 
priors. Ann. Statist. 17, 907-919. 
Hwang, J. T., Casella, G., Robert, C., Wells, M. T., and Farrell, R. (1990). Estimation of accuracy 
in testing. Biometrics Unit Technical Report BU-1027-M, Cornell University. 
Nachbin (1965). The Haar Integral. Van Nostrand. 
Stone, M. (1970). Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence in probability to invariant 
posterior distributions. Ann. Math. Statist. 41, 1349-1353. 
Tsui, K. and Weerahandi, S. (1989). Generalized p-values in significance testing of hypotheses on 
the presence of nuisance parameters. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 84, 602-609. 
